Abbas Khandan,
Volume 12, Issue 46 (12-2021)
Abstract
Collective pension funds have many advantages including larger risk pool and the possibility of interpersonal and intergenerational risk sharing, as well as economies of scale and lower administrative costs. For decades, however, this has been achieved through mandatory participation, while this traditional and mandatory form of contribution is no longer commensurate with the future of work. In this regard, many countries have implemented a combinatorial policy in the form of auto-enrolment pensions and then the granting of opting out authority. However, the sustainability of these schemes will depend on people's motivation to participate or leave. This article tries to examine the motivations of individuals to exit the Iran Social Security Organization (ISSO) pension fund, assuming that the insureds are given the opportunity to opt out once in a certain time. For this purpose, the method of option pricing is used. Findings show that insureds will accept even a 60 percent deficit in fund’s long-term liabilities for the only reason to take advantage of investment income of their predecessors funds or interpersonal and intergenerational risk sharing. It was also observed that an increase in the funding ratio, lower liabilities, a rise in assets and a higher rate of return on investments encourage participation and reduce the incentive to exit. A decline in accrual rate, increase in the contribution rate, higher retirement age, accelerating the adjustment rate of fund deficit due to their detrimental effect on the insureds have a direct negative effect on the incentive to participate and stimulate withdrawal. It should be noted, however, that these factors will also reduce liabilities and increase the funding ratio, thereby contributing to the sustainability of the plan may ultimately reduce the exit incentives.
Abbas Khandan, Ali Makhdoumi, Leili Niakan,
Volume 16, Issue 59 (5-2025)
Abstract
Objective: Despite their important role in Iran's welfare and economic system, pension funds have faced financial instability and serious threats in recent years due to financial challenges, especially the cash balance deficit. The aim of this study is to answer the hypothetical question of how much capital and assets is required at minimum to cover the deficit and liabilities of these pension funds.
Methodology: In this research which is a case study for one of the Iranian pension funds, by using two methods of futurology and the Value at Risk (VaR) models, an attempt has been made to estimate the minimum required capital for the financial sustainability of pilot pension fund.
Findings: The results show that in the scenario writing method, the minimum capital required to cover the deficit of this pilot pension fund in four scenarios based on the bond rate, ideal, optimistic and realistic, is on average more than 517 trillion tomans of assets for the year 1402. In the Value at Risk (VaR) method with different parametric (ARIMA-GARCH models) and non-parametric (Monte Carlo and bootstrap simulation) approaches, it was determined that this pilot pension fund needs on average more than 550 trillion tomans of assets for the year 1402 in order to cover its deficit with investment income. The results of this article considering the size of pension funds can be easily generalized to other funds and, thus, can be useful in adopting reform policies for financial sustainability in general.
