- Mohammad Mehdi Mojahedi Moakhar, Dr Rahim Dallali Esfahani, Dr Saeid Samadi, Dr Rasoul Bakhshi Dastjerdi,
Volume 2, Issue 5 (10-2011)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the source of fractional reserve banking and to review the literature on bank credit. Evaluating the operational procedure of this banking model demonstrates a new concept of credit money shaping aspect and its affect on the practical economy. The difference in due dates between depositing and receiving loan that causes Ex-nihio money to exist, the effect of this money on prices along with economic instability are among the issues that have occupied the critic scholar's minds in fractional reserve banking realm. In this paper, the effects of the fractional reserve banking model on the consumption behavior are analyzed. Also, the view points of the critics of this banking model are addressed. In this regard, an inter-generational consumption behavior model based on Maurice Allais's perspectives has developed. Results show that optimizing the existing model is the true test of the consumption instability in a permanent state in the fractional reserve banking realm. Also, according to the results there exits the possibility of instable capital repletion under certain circumstances.
Davoud Mahmoudinia, Jacob Engwerda, Rahim Dallali Esfahani, Rasul Bakhshi Dastjerdi, Majid Fakhar,
Volume 7, Issue 24 (6-2016)
Abstract
In this paper we analyzed the strategic interaction between government and central bank in Iranian economy. Using dynamic differential games and Nash equilibrium within cooperative and non-cooperative setting, we try to find the optimal values of debt, deficit and monetary base. The results of simulation show that in cooperative case the level of equilibrium debt is lower than the non-cooperative case and converge speed is higher in cooperative setting than non-cooperation setting. Also in cooperative case than non-cooperative case, less creation of money and less government deficit are needed for debt stabilization in long run. The results also show that in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases under uncertainty, more active policies are used to track debt to its equilibrium level. These active policies lead debt goes to smaller level.
