An Analysis of the Behavior of OPEC With the Approach of Evolutionary Game Theory

Khakestari, Marzieh; Joleini, Sahar; Ameli, Ahmad

doi:10.29252/jemr.8.31.103

Volume 9, Issue 31 (3-2018) jemr 2018, 9(31): 103-130 | Back to browse issues page

‎ 10.29252/jemr.8.31.103

‎ 20.1001.1.22286454.1397.8.31.1.8

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Khakestari M, Joleini S, Ameli A. An Analysis of the Behavior of OPEC With the Approach of Evolutionary Game Theory. jemr 2018; 9 (31) :103-130
URL: http://jemr.khu.ac.ir/article-1-1413-en.html

An Analysis of the Behavior of OPEC With the Approach of Evolutionary Game Theory

Marzieh Khakestari ^*

¹, Sahar Joleini²

, Ahmad Ameli²

1- Kharazmi University , m.khakestari@khu.ac.ir
2- Kharazmi University

Abstract: (6309 Views)

This paper implements an approach to examine economic problems in which rational agents interact in dynamic markets. We use evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling in tandem as a means to address intertemporal problems that display evolutionary attributes. This study examines the behavior of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the global oil markets during the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to control global oil markets during this period.. To address this, a symmetric evolutionary game theory model is used to examine the behavior of OPEC agents as they learned to take control of their resources. An agent-based modeling approach employs computational power to implement the evolutionary game and provide detailed results. It is shown that OPEC’s behavior over the period is dependent on the growth of petroleum reserves within the member nations. Increasing realizations of natural resource reserves spur increased rates of learning and experimentation, and this enables the cartel to act cooperatively and capture control of global petroleum markets. If reserves are kept constant, OPEC lingers at a state in which the cartel does not come to dominate world oil markets.

Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Agent-Based Modeling, OPEC

Full-Text [PDF 1165 kb] (4115 Downloads)

Type of Study: Applicable | Subject: رشد و توسعه و سیاست های کلان
Received: 2017/05/16 | Accepted: 2018/05/8 | Published: 2018/06/13

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