The question of cognition in human life is a long-standing and central issue that has arisen from the beginning of human thought about existence. The set of ideas presented in this regard has created the field of epistemology. There are original and interesting points about cognition in Rumi’s mystical heritage and an important part of his views on this subject is related to the discussion of human cognitive errors and limitations. This question has also been proposed in various ways in the Western philosophical tradition and has received answers and explanations. In this research, using a descriptive-analytical method and adopting a comparative approach an attempt has been made to investigate the multiple dimensions of human cognitive errors and limitations from Rumi’s perspective. To that end, we have also reviewed the evolutionary course of the subject in the Western philosophical tradition. Therefore, categories such as reason, experience, illusion, imagination, existence and appearance of the world have been dealt with followed by quotations and analyses of Rumi’s views on this subject. Finally, it is shown how Rumi also explored and expressed the multiple aspects of errors and limitations of human cognition and what similarities his views bear to the Western philosophical tradition. Moreover, the differences and similarities between the attitudes of philosophers and mystics towards the nature and quality of cognition have been studied. The most important differences can be seen in the pivotal role of reason among philosophers and its invalidity for some other aspects of cognition among mystics. On the other hand, the allegory of the cave in Plato’s philosophy and the question of existence and appearance of the world, and the role of imagination in investigating the world in the eyes of eighteenth-century idealist philosophers are very similar to the fundamentals of epistemology in Rumi’s views. It is found that part of Rumi’s views on describing the position of reason and human’s cognitive limitations is similar to the views of seventeenth-century rationalist epistemologists, and in terms of the special position of experience in cognition and its limitations, it is close to those of eighteenth-century empiricists.