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Showing 2 results for komijani
Dr Akbar Komijani, Hossein Tavakoliyanh,
Volume 2, Issue 6 (3-2012)
Abstract
According to Taylor (1993) rule, the monetary authority responds to deviations of output and of inflation from their targets through nominal interest rate fluctuations regarded as policy instrument. Another specification that has received considerable attention is that policymakers may have asymmetric preferences with regard to their objectives during recessions and expansions. Since according to Law for Usury (Interest) Free Banking of Iran, the objective of the central bank is not the control of interest rate, instead it is money growth rate which is used as an instrument, in this study we introduce a money growth rate reaction function and we use it to test the asymmetry in central bank behavior during recessions and expansions. The estimation results of a Markov Switching model for the period 1367:1 to 1387:2 show that the central bank sensitivity toward output is more during the recessions while its sensitivity toward inflation is more during the expansions.
Hossein Tavakolian, Akbar Komijani,
Volume 2, Issue 8 (9-2012)
Abstract
It is more likely that the monetary policy in Iran is discretionary and not based on a rule or a target. Besides, what is clear is that there have been explicit targets for inflation and economic growth in all five-year development plans (except the fifth plan). However, the question is that do policy makers observe the targets of development plans? Using an adjusted New Keynesian DSGE model for Iran, in this study we investigate the monetary policy under fiscal dominance and implicit inflation targeting of Iran. The results show that in most plans monetary authorities do not observe the explicit targets of five-year plans. The estimated monetary reaction function is only able to explain the period 2001-2011. The other result is that implementation delays of public projects have considerable effects on output and private consumption.
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