fa Modeling and Numerical Analysis of Revenue Sharing Contract Based on the Stackelberge Game Theory Research Paper مقاله پژوهشی Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. Considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, Stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. A general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract and centralized structure. Based on this model, we numerically analyzed the performance of revenue sharing contract in the considered supply chain and four states for revenue sharing contract are analyzed at the end. Moreover, in each state, performance of the system under revenue sharing contract is compared with the performance of the system under wholesale price contract and centralized structure. Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. Considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, Stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. A general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract and centralized structure. Based on this model, we numerically analyzed the performance of revenue sharing contract in the considered supply chain and four states for revenue sharing contract are analyzed at the end. Moreover, in each state, performance of the system under revenue sharing contract is compared with the performance of the system under wholesale price contract and centralized structure. Vendor managed inventory , Stackelberg game , Revenue sharing contract , Wholesale price contract , Centralized structure , Vendor managed inventory , Stackelberg game , Revenue sharing contract , Wholesale price contract , Centralized structure , 439 465 http://system.khu.ac.ir/ijsom/browse.php?a_code=A-10-20-1&slc_lang=fa&sid=1 Mohammad Saber Fallah Nezhad Mohammad Saber Fallah Nezhad fallahnezhad@yazd.ac.ir 1003194753284600126 1003194753284600126 Yes Department of Industrial Engineering, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran Department of Industrial Engineering, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran Hasan Rasay Hasan Rasay hasan.rasay@gmail.com 1003194753284600127 1003194753284600127 No yazd university, Yazd, Iran yazd university, Yazd, Iran Yahya Zare Mehrjerdi Yahya Zare Mehrjerdi yazm2000@yahoo.com 1003194753284600128 1003194753284600128 No Department of Industrial Engineering, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran Department of Industrial Engineering, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran