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Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Grey Shapley Value
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Sirma Zeynep Alparslan Gok *   1, Osman Palanci1 , Mehmet Onur Olgun1 |
| 1- Süleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Mathematics, 32260 Isparta, Turkey |
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Abstract: (12977 Views) |
| The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. Certainly, the Shapley value can be used in interesting sharing cost/reward problems in the Operations Research area such as connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory situations. In this paper, we focus on the Shapley value for cooperative games, where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are interval grey numbers. The central question in this paper is how to characterize the grey Shapley value. In this context, we present two alternative axiomatic characterizations. First, we characterize the grey Shapley value using the properties of efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Second, we characterize the grey Shapley value by using the grey dividends. |
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| Keywords: Cooperative games, Uncertainty, Grey numbers, The Shapley value, Dividends, Decision making, Operations Research |
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Type of Study: مقاله پژوهشی |
ePublished: 2017/09/28
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